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viduals  in  the domain  of  disadvantageous  inequality  while  the  benevolence  in  the domain
of  advantageous  inequality  is  similar  across  decision  makers.  A consequence  for the  fre-
quency  of  preference  types  is  that  while  a substantial  fraction  of individuals  is classiﬁed
as inequality  averse,  this  type  disappears  completely  in  teams.  Spiteful  types  are  markedly
more frequent  among  individuals  than  among  teams.  On the other hand,  by  far more  teams
than individuals  are classiﬁed  as efﬁciency  lovers.
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1. Introduction
Small group or small team decision making is ubiquitous. Boards decide on monetary policies and corporate strategies,
families decide on holidays and purchases, governments decide on economic policies, and teams in trade unions and in
companies shape wage negotiations. Some teams have a hierarchical structure, others aggregate preferences in a setting in
which all team members are equal ex ante. For reasons of parsimony we  focus on the latter case, as do most contributions
to the quickly growing literature on differences in decision making between individuals and small teams (cf., Charness and
Sutter, 2012 or Kugler et al., 2012, for instance). Teams with ex ante equal members that aggregate preferences to a single
decision and do not face an internal conﬂict of interest in material terms are called unitary groups or unitary teams.1
Many decisions in unitary teams concern the distribution of an amount of money or some other resource between the
team and another team or individual. In such decisions, the theoretical prediction for own-money maximizing team members
is trivial. As soon as team members exhibit heterogeneous social preferences, however, the aggregation of these preferences
into a joint team decision becomes relevant. The vast majority of the existing literature in economics infers results on the
aggregation of social preferences within teams from the behavior of individuals in interactive games (e.g., Bornstein and
Yaniv, 1998; Cox, 2002; Bornstein et al., 2004; Kugler et al., 2007). The general ﬁnding is that team decisions are closer to
the rational own-money maximizing prediction than individual decisions. However, there is also a small number of results
with the opposite ﬁnding of less selﬁsh team decisions (e.g., Kocher and Sutter, 2007; Müller and Tan, 2013).
In games, (bounded) rationality, other-regarding preferences and beliefs (about the behavior, the expectations or the
types of others) are often hard to disentangle. Hence, one has to be cautious in over-interpreting the above results when the
intention is to study the aggregation of social preferences in small teams. To the best of our knowledge, only two  papers use
the simplest possible allocation task – the dictator game – to assess the differences between team and individual decisions.
Cason and Mui  (1997) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between two-person teams and individuals (but report more
other-regarding team choices when team members differ in their individual dictator game choices). Also using a dictator
game, but with teams of three persons, Luhan et al. (2009) ﬁnd that teams behave more selﬁshly than individuals. Given the
inconclusiveness of existing results, additional evidence on the aggregation of social preferences within small teams seems
desirable.
Furthermore, while the dictator game is a good starting point for establishing differences in social preferences between
individuals and teams and for analyzing the aggregation of individual preferences in teams, it is not suitable to distinguish
between different individual motivations for pro-social behavior and it gives no information on the presence of anti-social
motives. There is good reason to believe – if one takes a closer look at some of the results in the literature on team decisions
in interactive games (Charness and Sutter, 2012; Kugler et al., 2012) – that one should distinguish between different motiva-
tions. In particular, efﬁciency orientation seems to be ampliﬁed in team decision making, whereas inequality-averse choices
seem to be less prevalent among teams than among individuals. Also, it seems important to ﬁnd out whether teams and
individuals differ in the relative frequency of anti-social motivations. It is exactly this disentangling of different motivations
for pro-social behavior and the elicitation of anti-social motives of small teams vs. individual decision makers that is the
object of interest in the current paper.
More speciﬁcally, we provide evidence from a controlled laboratory experiment, in which we  use the double price-list
technique developed by Kerschbamer (2013) to elicit the distributional preferences of subjects under two different decision-
making regimes: an individual regime, in which subjects make their allocation decisions independently and in which each
choice has consequences for the decision maker and one passive agent; and a team regime in which subjects assigned
to groups of three must reach their allocation decisions unanimously with the help of communication and in which each
choice has consequences for each group member and each member of a passive group. We  employ a mixed within- and
between-subjects design in two sets of sessions run in two  consecutive weeks. In the ﬁrst week all subjects are exposed to
the individual regime. In the second week some subjects are again exposed to the individual regime, while the rest make
their choices in the team regime. This design feature allows us to address the question how the revealed distributional
preferences of individual team members (in the individual regime in week 1) translate into ‘team preferences’ (in the team
regime in week 2). It also allows us to test whether individual choices in the allocation tasks remain stable over time –
which turns out to be the case – and whether the randomization of the assignment of subjects to the individual and the
team regime in week 2 was successful – which it was.
Our main ﬁnding is that the decision-making regime, i.e., whether decisions are made by individuals or by teams, has
an economically strong and statistically signiﬁcant impact on revealed distributional preferences in the allocation tasks. In
other words, the type of the decision maker – individual or team – matters in the context of allocation decisions. In particular,
teams are signiﬁcantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality – that is, in decision
making environments where the peer is ahead – while benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar
across decision-making regimes. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that, while a substantial fraction
(15%) of individuals are classiﬁed as inequality averse, this type disappears completely in the case of team decision making.
Spiteful types are also markedly more frequent among individuals than among teams. On the other hand, by far more teams
1 The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, sometimes not. We stick to the term “team” in the following.
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han individuals are classiﬁed as efﬁciency lovers. The fact that team decision making results in a very high proportion (over
0%) of choices consistent with a taste for efﬁciency and at the same time eliminates choices consistent with inequality
version, is in our view the single most interesting result of this study. It conﬁrms the ad-hoc hypothesis from previous
xperiments that could, however, not rigorously test for speciﬁc individual motivations.
Motivated by the strong differences in the choices of individuals and teams, we open the ‘black box’ of decision making
ithin teams to gain some insights into the process that aggregates individual preferences into team choices. Our two
ain ﬁndings in this respect are, ﬁrst, that efﬁciency lovers – and, more generally, subjects with a positive benevolence in
he domain of disadvantageous inequality – are, ceteris paribus, more assertive, in the sense that they are generally more
uccessful in getting their team to adopt their preferred choices. And, second, as a content analysis of the chat logs reveals,
ertain types of arguments are signiﬁcantly more – or less – persuasive than others during the team’s communication. For
nstance, appeals to own income maximization are, somewhat surprisingly, detrimental to assertiveness, as are arguments
n favor of strong altruistic behavior (that is, giving up own income to help the others).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some details on the technique that we use for the
licitation of distributional preferences, as well as on the speciﬁcs of our design. Section 3 presents our ﬁndings regarding
evealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams and the differences between the two. Section 4 focuses on
ecision making at the team level and Section 5 concludes the paper.
. Experimental design
.1. Elicitation of distributional preferences
The elicitation of distributional preferences is based on the methodology developed by Kerschbamer (2013). This proce-
ure exposes subjects to a series of binary choices between allocations that involve an own payoff for the decision maker
individual or team) and a payoff for a randomly matched anonymous second entity, the passive agent (individual or team).
n each of the binary decision problems one of the two  allocations is symmetric (i.e., egalitarian – involving equal payoffs for
he two agents) while the other one is asymmetric (involving unequal payoffs for the two  agents). In half of the problems the
symmetric allocation is such that the decision maker is ahead, in the other half it is such that the decision maker is behind
he passive agent in monetary terms. For both cases the test systematically varies the price of giving (or taking) by increasing
he own material payoff of the decision maker in the asymmetric allocation while keeping the other payoffs constant.
We used the ten-items version of the procedure displayed in Table 1. With our parameterization the egalitarian allocation
ives 20 points to both agents, at the exchange rate of 20 Euro-Cents per point (i.e., 5 points = 1 Euro). In ﬁve of the ten binary
hoices – labeled in Table 1 (but not in the experimental instructions) as disadvantageous inequality block (DIB) – the payoff
f the passive agent in the asymmetric allocation is 30 points while the payoff of the decision maker increases from one
hoice to the next from 15 points in the ﬁrst choice task to 25 points in the last one. In the other ﬁve binary choices – the
dvantageous inequality block (AIB) – the payoff of the passive agent in the asymmetric allocation is ten points while the
est is exactly as in the DIB – that is, the payoff of the decision maker in the asymmetric allocation increases again from one
hoice to the next from 15 points to 25 points.
Given this design, in each of the two blocks a rational decision maker switches at most once from the symmetric to the
symmetric allocation (and never in the other direction) and the switch points in the two  blocks are informative about the
able 1
hoices in the distributional-preferences elicitation task.
Disadvantageous inequality block (DIB)
Left Your choice (please mark) Right
You get Passive agent gets You get Passive agent gets
15 points 30 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
19  points 30 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
20  points 30 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
21  points 30 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
25  points 30 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
Advantageous inequality block (AIB)
Left Your choice (please mark) Right
You get Passive agent gets You get Passive agent gets
15 points 10 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
19  points 10 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
20  points 10 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
21  points 10 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
25  points 10 points Left © © Right 20 points 20 points
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Table  2
Choices in the elicitation task and revealed WTP.
Disadvantageous inequality block (DIB)
In the DIB subject chooses LEFT for the ﬁrst time in row WTPd Proxy for WTPd used Counted as
1 +0.5 ≤WTPd +0.5 Benevolent
2  +0.1 ≤WTPd< +0.5 +0.3 Benevolent
3  +0.0 ≤WTPd< +0.1 +0.05 Benevolent
4  −0.1 ≤WTPd< −0.0 −0.05 Malevolent
5  −0.5 ≤WTPd< −0.1 −0.3 Malevolent
Never  WTPd< −0.5 −0.5 Malevolent
Advantageous inequality block (AIB)
In the AIB subject chooses LEFT for the ﬁrst time in row WTPa Proxy for WTPa used Counted as
1 WTPa≤ −0.5 −0.5 Malevolent
2  −0.5 <WTPa≤ −0.1 −0.3 Malevolent
3  −0.1 <WTPa≤ −0.0 −0.05 Malevolent
4  +0.0 <WTPa≤ +0.1 +0.05 Benevolent
5  +0.1 <WTPa≤ 0.5 +0.3 Benevolent
Never  +0.5 <WTPa +0.5 Benevolent
WTPd for WPTd > 0: |WTPd| = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order
to  increase the other’s material payoff by one unit.
WTPd for WPTd < 0: |WTPd| = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order
to  decrease the other’s material payoff by one unit (in this interpretation inequalities need to be reversed; for instance, subjects who  never switch in the
DIB  reveal that they are willing to give up at least 50 Cents of their own income to decrease the income of the other player by 1 Euro).
WTPa deﬁned analogously for the domain of advantageous inequality,
decision maker’s archetype and intensity of distributional preferences.2 Speciﬁcally, when faced with the ﬁve binary choices
in the disadvantageous inequality block (DIB), a rational decision maker who  decides for the asymmetric allocation already
in the ﬁrst choice task reveals that he is benevolent in the domain of disadvantageous inequality. Why? Because he is willing
to give up own  material income to increase the material payoff of the passive agent. Speciﬁcally, the decision maker is willing
to give up at least ﬁve points to increase the material payoff of the passive agent by ten points. In Table 2 we record this as
“WTPd ≥ 0.5”, since this choice pattern reveals that in the domain of disadvantageous inequality the decision maker is willing
to give up at least half a point in order to increase the other’s material payoff by one point. Here, WTP  stands for “willingness
to pay” (for an income increase of the passive agent), and the superscript indicates the domain (d stands for disadvantageous
and a for advantageous inequality). By contrast, a rational decision maker who decides for the asymmetric allocation for the
ﬁrst time in the fourth choice or later (or chooses the egalitarian allocation throughout the DIB) reveals malevolence in the
domain of disadvantageous inequality. Strict malevolence means that the decision maker is willing to give up own income
to decrease the material payoff of the passive agent – in Table 2 strict malevolence manifests itself in a negative WTP. For
instance, the entry “WTPd < −0.5” in the sixth row of the DIB of Table 2 means that the decision maker is willing to give up
at least ﬁve points to decrease the material payoff of the passive agent by ten points. This is inferred from the choice of the
symmetric allocation (yielding twenty points for both agents) in the last row of the DIB of Table 1 where the asymmetric
allocation would have implied a payoff of 25 points for the decision maker and a payoff of 30 points for the passive agent.
Note that we count the absence of benevolence as weak malevolence (WTPd = −0.0) and the absence of malevolence as weak
benevolence (WTPd = +0.0). That is, a decision maker who  decides for the symmetric allocation in the ﬁrst two  choice tasks
of the DIB and for the asymmetric allocation in the other three choice tasks is classiﬁed as benevolent, while a decision
maker who decides for the asymmetric allocation for the ﬁrst time in the fourth row is classiﬁed as malevolent. This is so
because the former decision maker could have decreased the income of the passive agent at no cost (by switching later) but
decided not to do so, while the latter could have increased the income of the passive agent at no cost (by switching earlier)
but decided not to do so.
Turning to the binary decisions in the advantageous inequality block (AIB), a rational subject who is (at least weakly)
benevolent in the domain of advantageous inequality decides for the asymmetric allocation for the ﬁrst time in the fourth
choice or later, while switching earlier (or favoring the asymmetric allocation all the time) is inconsistent with weak benev-
olence (and therefore counted as malevolence) in this domain. Again, benevolence is associated with a positive WTP  and
malevolence is associated with a negative WTP.
Below we will sometimes work with the proxies of the WTP  measure of distributional preferences shown in the ﬁfth
column of Table 2. Combining the information about benevolence (or malevolence) of a decision maker in the two  domains
allows classifying subjects into archetypes of distributional preferences. Speciﬁcally, we  deﬁne the following types:
2 The procedure relies only on minimal assumptions regarding the rationality of agents. In terms of axioms on preferences the assumptions are ordering
(completeness and transitivity) and strict (own-money) monotonicity – see Kerschbamer (2013) for details. In the main text, agents whose preferences
satisfy those two basic axioms are referred to as “rational”.
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EFF: a decision maker who reveals benevolence in both domains is classiﬁed as efﬁciency loving;
IAV: a decision maker who reveals malevolence in the DIB and benevolence in the AIB is classiﬁed as inequality averse;
SPI: a decision maker who reveals malevolence in both domains is classiﬁed as spiteful;
ILO: a decision maker who reveals benevolence in the DIB and malevolence in the AIB is classiﬁed as inequality loving.3
Note that according to this classiﬁcation selﬁsh decision makers are assigned to one of the four distributional preference
ypes according to their ‘impartial view’ expressed in their choice behavior in the third row of the two decision blocks in
able 1 (where the decision maker decides between two allocations that differ only in the payoff of the passive agent).
peciﬁcally, a decision maker who decides for the asymmetric allocation in the third row of the DIB and for the symmetric
llocation in the third row of the AIB reveals benevolence in both domains and is therefore classiﬁed as EFF. By contrast, a
ecision maker who decides for the symmetric allocation in the third row of both blocks reveals malevolence in the domain
f disadvantageous inequality and benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality and is therefore classiﬁed as IAV.
imilarly, a decision for the symmetric allocation in the third row of the DIB and for the asymmetric allocation in the third
ow of the AIB reveals malevolence in both domains (justifying classiﬁcation as SPI), while a decision for the asymmetric
llocation in the third row of both blocks reveals benevolence in the domain of disadvantageous inequality and malevolence
n the domain of advantageous inequality (justifying classiﬁcation as ILO).4
.2. Sessions and treatments
The experiment was run over two weeks in December 2010 at the University of Innsbruck. All sessions were computerized
sing z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). With ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), we  recruited 198 students from various academic backgrounds.
e ran twelve sessions with 12–18 subjects in each session, depending on subject turnout.
In week 1 we elicited the distributional preferences of all subjects using the incentivized procedure outlined in Section 2.1,
o that we were able to characterize each subject by a two-dimensional preference index (WTPd and WTPa), or alternatively
y a distributional preference type (EFF, IAV, SPI or ILO). When making their choices, subjects knew that they would receive
wo cash payments for this task, one as an active person and one as a passive person.5 After having made their choices in the
istributional preference tasks, subjects took the Machiavelli personality test (Christie and Geis, 1970), which consists of 20
uestions aimed at measuring a person’s assertiveness and ability to impose his or her opinion on others, on a scale between
0 and 100. Subjects also took a ten-question version of the Big-5 personality questionnaire (Gosling et al., 2003), which
nalyses personality along ﬁve fundamental traits termed extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and
penness. No payment was made in week 1 – subjects were rather informed already in the recruiting mail that the experiment
ould consist of two parts distributed over two consecutive weeks and that they would receive their total payment at the
nd of the second week, provided they attended both parts.
In week 2 we implemented two decision-making regimes. In the individual regime subjects simply repeated the procedure
f week 1 for the elicitation of distributional preferences. In the team regime subjects were randomly assigned to groups
f three and we elicited distributional preferences at the team level. Speciﬁcally, teams were asked to make the ten binary
hoices of the elicitation task, deciding on payoff allocations each implying a payoff for each team member (the same for each
ember) and a payoff for each member of a so-called “passive team” (again, the same for each member). Team members
new that they would receive two payments from this task, a payment as a member of the active team as well as a payment
s a member of the passive team, similar to the individual regime of week 1 as described above. In both regimes at the end of
he week 2 session each subject received two cash payments per week, one as an active person and one as a passive person.
or each of these cash payments, one of the ten binary choices was  randomly selected by the computer and implemented.
The rule for decision making within teams was that all ten choices had to be unanimous. Speciﬁcally, each team member
as initially exposed to the ten binary choices and was asked to submit his or her proposals for the ten team decisions.
nce each of the three team members had done so for each of the decision tasks, the proposal of each member was  shown
n a new screen, so that everyone could identify the cases of disagreement. After that, a chat room was  opened for ﬁve
inutes, in which the team members could communicate in order to achieve a unanimous decision. The chat content was
nrestricted, except that subjects were explicitly told not to identify themselves in any way and neither to use offensive
anguage nor to threaten others. At the end of the ﬁrst chat round, each member was again asked to submit a proposal for
he team decisions. If unanimity was reached at this stage, the ten choices were implemented and the team waited for the
est of the session. If unanimity was not reached, the updated decisions submitted by each member were shown again, and
3 The category ILO is introduced for completeness only; we  do not expect to ﬁnd many of them (although there is some evidence in Fershtman et al.
2012), for this type). Note that in the literature spiteful subjects are sometimes called “competitive” or “status seeking”, while inequality averse subjects
re  sometimes called “egalitarian”. Also note that subjects who reveal benevolence in both domains could be labeled “altruistic” instead of “efﬁciency
oving”.  See Kerschbamer (2013) for a discussion and for references.
4 We also tried an alternative classiﬁcation distinguishing between the ﬁve types ‘strongly efﬁciency loving’, ‘strongly inequality averse’, ‘strongly spiteful’,
strongly inequality loving’, and ‘selﬁsh’. Qualitatively, the results reported in Sections 3 and 4 are very similar with this alternative classiﬁcation.
5 We employed the double role assignment protocol as used by Andreoni and Miller (2002), for instance, in their dictator games. This means that in our
rotocol each decision making entity (individual or team) makes distributional choices, and each entity receives two payoffs, one as an active decision
aker  and one as a passive agent.
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at the same time the team was given a second opportunity to chat, this time for three minutes. Exactly the same procedure
was repeated for a maximum of ﬁve chat rounds. Subjects were informed at the beginning that in case that unanimity within
a team was not reached before the end of the ﬁfth chat round, all members of that team would receive a payment of zero,
while the payment for the corresponding passive team would be randomly determined by the computer.
Asking for unanimity and implementing an unattractive default in case unanimity is not reached (before the end of the
ﬁfth chat round) induces a strong incentive to conform, of course. One could argue that this constellation alone induces a
team effect by design. In our view this is not that obvious. Under a majority rule, the majority would be able to impose its
will on the minority. If it does so in a context with heterogeneous preferences, this necessarily induces a team effect unless
preference types have roughly the same frequency. This is not the case under unanimity where each team member has the
vested power to refuse approval of decision proﬁles proposed by other team members. If all types of arguments and all types
of proposals have the same chance of being approved by other team members then it could well be that in the aggregate
teams exhibit the same distribution of choices as individuals. It is exactly the question whether this is indeed the case for
choices involving income allocations, which is addressed in the current paper.
Our design allows us to make the following comparisons, which will form the core of our analysis:
(i) At a ﬁrst stage, in order to test for successful randomization, we will compare the week 1 choices of subjects who were
assigned (in week 2) to the individual regime to those of subjects assigned (in week 2) to the team regime. We call those
two sets of observations IND1 and TEAM1, respectively.
(ii) To determine whether choices remain stable over time, we will compare the choices in week 1 and in week 2 of those
subjects who were assigned to the individual regime in week 2. We  call those two sets of observations IND1 (as above)
and IND2, respectively.
(iii) To test for the presence of a treatment effect (individual regime vs. team regime) we will rely on two  different sources
of information. First, we will compare the week 2 choices in the individual regime to those in the team regime. These
two sets of observations are called IND2 (as above) and TEAM2, respectively. Second, we will compare the choices
in TEAM1 to those in TEAM2. Differences in this latter comparison potentially also reveal that team decision making
changes revealed distributional preferences, in the sense that the same subjects reach different choices when they act
individually and when they act as part of a team. However, while the comparison IND2 vs. TEAM2 compares individual
and team decisions between subjects, the comparison TEAM1 vs. TEAM2 compares choices within subjects – once taken
individually, once taken within a team. For this latter comparison, it is important to control for the effect of exposing
the same subjects to the same task twice, as we  do in comparison (ii) above.
We ran nine sessions for TEAM1 and TEAM2, and three sessions for IND1 and IND2, with the purpose of (roughly)
equalizing the number of independent observations between the two decision-making regimes in week 2. In the end, we
were able to collect 54 observations for the individual regime and 47 observations for the team regime (i.e., observations
from 47 teams, or 141 subjects). These numbers exclude three subjects who  made inconsistent choices, hence bringing the
total number of subjects used in our analysis to 195. Sessions lasted for approximately 45 min  in week 1 and in TEAM2 in
week 2, and approximately 30 min  in IND2 in week 2. The average total earning per subject was D16.80.
3. Revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams
We  begin by analyzing the differences between individual and team choices along the comparisons described in Section
2.2 (i.e., among IND1, IND2, TEAM1 and TEAM2). Later, in Section 4, we will delve into the speciﬁcs of the decision-making
process within teams and the way that this translates individual preferences into team choices.
3.1. Revealed willingness to pay
Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that willingness to pay in the domain of disadvantageous inequality depends strongly on the
decision-making regime (individual regime vs. team regime), while willingness to pay in the domain of advantageous
inequality does not. This is shown in Table 3. The two variables of interest, WTPd and WTPa, are the proxies for willing-
ness to pay as deﬁned in the last column of Table 2 – each of them can take on six possible discrete values in the interval
Table 3
Willingness to pay (WTP).
IND1 TEAM1 IND2 TEAM2
WTPd 0.087 0.103 0.108 0.184
WTPa 0.150 0.201 0.191 0.216
N  54 141 54 141 (47 teams)
In the within-subjects comparison TEAM1 vs. TEAM2, we are using the team’s decision as the decision of each individual subject (so that N = 141 for those
tests).
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Table  4
Distributional preference types.
IND1 TEAM1 IND2 TEAM2
EFF 66.7% 78.0% 70.4% 93.6%
IAV  13.0% 8.5% 14.8% 0.0%
SPI  13.0% 10.6% 13.0% 4.3%
ILO  7.4% 2.8% 1.9% 2.1%
N  54 141 54 141 (47 teams)
In the within-subjects comparison TEAM1 vs. TEAM2, we are using the team’s decision as the decision of each individual subject (so that N = 141 for those
tests).
Table 5
Distribution of types in treatments IND1 and IND2 (individual choices only).
Distribution of types, IND2
EFF IAV SPI ILO
Distribution of types, IND1
EFF 35 1 0 0
IAV  0 6 0 1
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SPI  2 1 4 0
ILO  1 0 3 0
−0.5, 0.5], where a higher value indicates higher willingness to pay for an increase in the income of the passive agent. Thus,
 higher value of WTPd (WTPa, respectively) corresponds to more benevolence in the domain of disadvantageous inequality
advantageous inequality, respectively).
Comparing the four sets of observations, the ﬁrst thing to note is the absence of signiﬁcant differences between IND1 and
EAM1 along both dimensions of willingness to pay, revealing that the randomization into treatments has been successful
p > 0.3, Mann–Whitney U-tests). Moreover, choices remain constant over time given the small and statistically insigniﬁcant
ifferences between IND1 and IND2 (p > 0.2, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests).
Turning to the main comparison of individual against team decision making, we  ﬁnd that the willingness to pay in
he domain of disadvantageous inequality (WTPd) is signiﬁcantly higher when decisions are taken by teams compared to
ndividuals (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank test of TEAM1 vs. TEAM2; p = 0.06, Mann–Whitney U-test of IND2 vs. TEAM2).
t the same time, the above tests applied to WTPa reveal that the decision-making regime does not affect benevolence in
he domain of advantageous inequality (p > 0.4, TEAM1 vs. TEAM2; p > 0.5, IND2 vs. TEAM2). Hence, we  conclude that the
illingness to pay in the domain of advantageous inequality is not affected by whether distributional choices are made
y teams or individuals, while in the domain of disadvantageous inequality teams make more benevolent choices than
ndividuals, leading to higher efﬁciency. This latter interpretation will be taken up in the following section, which discusses
he distributional preference types that emerge in each treatment.
.2. Revealed distributional preference types
Table 4 classiﬁes the decision makers in each of the four sets of observations in distributional preference types. All of
ur ﬁndings are in line with the treatment differences documented in the previous section in the analysis of willingness
o pay. The ﬁrst thing to notice, by comparing the ﬁrst two  columns in Table 4, is that our randomization was  successful,
s documented by the insigniﬁcant differences in proportions between IND1 and TEAM1 (p > 0.1, 2-tests for all four types
f distributional preferences).6 Moreover, individual behavior remains constant over time, in the sense that the fact that
ubjects are exposed to the same set of decisions in two consecutive weeks does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the
istribution of revealed preference types (comparison between IND1 and IND2; p > 0.3, McNemar’s tests for all four types).
able 5 supports this claim by showing that preference types remain predominantly constant over the two  weeks at the
ndividual level.7
On the contrary, the signiﬁcant differences between TEAM1 and TEAM2 reveal that it matters a lot whether choices are
ade by individuals or by teams. In particular, McNemar’s test results for within-subjects comparisons reveal that the samendividuals are signiﬁcantly more likely to make choices consistent with efﬁciency maximization in week 2 – when they
ecide as members of a team – than in week 1 when they decide as individuals (p < 0.01); and also that their choices in week
 are signiﬁcantly less often classiﬁed as inequality averse (p < 0.01) or as spiteful (p = 0.05) than in week 1.
6 A 2-test comparing the entire distribution of types (all four proportions) between IND1 and TEAM1 yields p = 0.3.
7 Notice also the very high Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcients for types and choices between IND1 and IND2:  = 0.80 for the distribution of types;
 = 0.50 for choices in the disadvantageous inequality block;  = 0.53 for choices in the advantageous inequality block; p < 0.01 for all correlation coefﬁcients.
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Table  6
Correspondence between types of team members and team types.
Types of team members Team type Mean # of stages to unanimity N
3 × EFF EFF (22) 1.41 22
2  × EFF, 1 × SPI EFF (10) 2.30 10
2  × EFF, 1 × IAV EFF (6) 2.17 6
2  × EFF, 1 × ILO EFF (2), SPI (1) 1.33 3
1  × EFF, 1 × IAV, 1 × SPI EFF (2), ILO (1) 3.0 3
1  × EFF, 1 × IAV, 1 × ILO EFF (1) 2.0 1
1  × EFF, 2 × SPI SPI (1) 2.0 1
1  × EFF, 2 × IAV EFF (1) 2.0 1
Total  EFF (44), SPI (2), IL (1) 1.83 47
Given the previous comparisons, it is hardly surprising that we  document strong and signiﬁcant differences between the
choices of individuals and teams in week 2 (see the last two columns of Table 4). These differences allow for a nice overview
of our main ﬁndings regarding how decision making by individuals and by teams results in different distributions of types. In
particular, the vast majority of teams (44 of 47, or 94%) are classiﬁed as efﬁciency loving. This percentage is markedly lower
among individuals (with 70%), and the difference is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.01, chi squared test). This result echoes
the ﬁnding that teams display higher willingness to pay (benevolence) than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous
inequality. A second striking ﬁnding is that there is not a single team that is classiﬁed as inequality averse! Although not
higher than 15%, the share of inequality averse choices is signiﬁcantly higher in treatment IND2 (p < 0.01, chi squared test).
Spiteful types are also more common among individuals than among teams, although this time the difference is not quite
signiﬁcant (13% vs. 4%, p = 0.13), probably due to the low number of observations.
4. Decision-making process within teams
Having documented substantial differences in the ﬁnal choices of individuals and teams, we now turn to the speciﬁcs of
the process of team decision making which can give us insights into the sources of these differences. All 47 teams managed
to reach a unanimous decision, so the default payment was never implemented. Two  teams did not need to chat at all,
because their initial choices happened to coincide. About half of the teams (21 of 47, or 45%) reached unanimity after the
ﬁrst chat opportunity (i.e., at the end of Stage 1). Fourteen teams reached unanimity after Stage 2, ﬁve teams needed a third
chat round, three teams needed a fourth chat round, and two teams had to use all ﬁve chat rounds – but also managed to
agree in the end.
4.1. Aggregation of distributional preferences
We  begin this part of the analysis by giving an overview of the relation between the distributional preferences of team
members (as elicited in TEAM1 in week 1) and the resulting team type (as elicited in TEAM2 in week 2).
As can be seen in Table 6, whenever at least two efﬁciency lovers are in the team, the team is always also of type EFF –
with just one exception of a team that has an inequality lover and becomes SPI. This table is in more general terms indicative
of the fact that will be discussed in detail in the analysis that follows: efﬁciency lovers appear to be in a better position to
assert themselves within the team and convince their teammates to adopt their preferred distributional choices.
4.2. Assertiveness in the decision-making process
We  measure a team member’s assertiveness by means of his or her ability to inﬂuence the team’s decision-making process
so that the team’s ﬁnal choices differ as little as possible from the individual’s initial proposals. For this purpose we create
the variable assert,  which is deﬁned for each team member as the number of ﬁnal team choices (out of 10) that are the same
as the proposals submitted by that team member at the initial stage of the experiment in week 2 (i.e., before the start of the
team interaction via the chat process). The idea is then to relate assertiveness to individual willingness to pay as well as to
distributional types – as they have been elicited in week 1.
Beginning with types, a simple look at the mean number of own  choices coinciding with those of the team reveals that
efﬁciency lovers are, on average, much more successful than the rest in getting their proposals through within the team. Their
average success rate is nine choices out of ten, in contrast to 7.58 choices for inequality averse individuals and 6.4 choices
for spiteful types. Pairwise comparisons reveal that the difference between EFF and these two  other types is statistically
signiﬁcant (p < 0.05, Mann–Whitney tests). Inequality lovers are actually almost as successful as EFF in getting their proposed
choices to be adopted by the team (mean assert equals 8.75), but the fact that there are only four individuals classiﬁed as
inequality lovers limits the power of statistical inference for this type.
Naturally, a team member’s ability to impose his or her proposals is expected to depend on the distribution of types
within teams. Since a team is made up of three members, having at least one more person of the same type is expected to
substantially increase one’s assertiveness within the team. In Table 7 we  report results from two  Tobit regressions that aim
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Table  7
Assertiveness in the decision-making process.
Tobit regressions, marginal effects Dependent variable: assert (right-censored at 10, left-censored at 0)
(1) (2)
SPI −2.065**(0.856)
IAV −0.820 (0.903)
ILO 1.108 (1.351)
At least one same 1.339** (0.551)
WTPd 4.225***(1.094)
WTPa 0.005 (1.138)
Female 0.039 (0.410) 0.269 (0.459)
Age 0.019 (0.051) 0.053 (0.044)
Machiavelli 0.007 (0.013) 0.009 (0.014)
Constant 7.452*** (1.726) 6.802***(1.517)
Prob > F 0.000 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.046
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e = 141; standard errors in brackets, clustered by team.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
o explain assertiveness based on distributional preferences and some further controls. The dependent variable is assert. On
he right hand side we place, in (1), the various distributional types – with EFF left out as the reference group. To control
or the composition of teams in terms of preference types, we include an explanatory variable called at least one same: this
ariable is 1 for a subject if at least one other member of the team is of the same type. In (2), the explanatory variables are
he two indices of willingness to pay, WTPd and WTPa. To account for interdependence between the three members within
 given team, the regressions report standard errors clustered at the team level.
The results in column (1) of Table 7 reveal that the success rates of efﬁciency lovers are much higher as compared to
piteful types. In particular, the coefﬁcient on SPI in column (1) is negative and highly signiﬁcant, revealing that spiteful
ypes are able to get through two choices less compared to efﬁciency minded individuals. Inequality averse types are also
ess successful at asserting their proposals than EFF, but more so than SPI. However, the difference to EFF is not signiﬁcant,
nd neither is the difference to SPI (F test, p = 0.32). Hence, we  conclude that spiteful types are less assertive than efﬁciency
overs in this experiment, but there is no difference across all other types. As expected, having at least one other person of
he same type within the team substantially increases one’s assertiveness: the coefﬁcient of at least one same is larger than
ne, and it is signiﬁcant.8
In column (2), we see that willingness to pay in the domain of disadvantageous inequality is a strong predictor of assertive-
ess, with more benevolent subjects (higher WTPd) asserting, on average, a signiﬁcantly higher number of proposals – the
ifference is more than four proposals. This result is not unexpected, in the sense that subjects with a high willingness to
ay are more efﬁciency-minded, and we know that efﬁciency lovers are more assertive than spiteful subjects and not less
ssertive than the other two types. On the contrary, the coefﬁcient of WTPa is practically zero, and once again this dimension
oes not appear to matter in team decision making. The regressions control for gender, age, as well as for individual scores
n the Machiavelli personality test. None of these variables has a signiﬁcant impact on assertiveness.
We tried alternative speciﬁcations, for instance replacing at least one same in (1) with the number of same-type members
n the team (i.e., 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether none, one or two  other members revealed the same type). All the results
emain qualitatively the same. We  also tried regressions including the Big-5 traits elicited in week 1. The additional variables
re all insigniﬁcant and do not change any of our results; therefore they are not reported here. Finally, we note that both
peciﬁcations in Table 7 are robust to group ﬁxed effects.
.3. Content analysis
Having identiﬁed differences in assertiveness between types, we next ask the question of how these differences emerge
hrough the process of intra-team communication. Hence, the ﬁnal step in our analysis of preference aggregation within a
eam is the study of the chat content. For this purpose, we employed two research assistants who  had to read the entire chat
ndependently and to identify all arguments that belonged to a number of relevant categories. These categories, outlined in
able 8, had been previously determined by two members of the research team who  independently read parts of the chat logs
nd identiﬁed relevant arguments and statements. This procedure for content analysis is standard practice in experimental
ork in economics (see, for example, Cooper and Kagel, 2005). A subject was  classiﬁed by the two coders as having used the
rgument of a certain category if that argument was  found in any round of his or her chat history. In that case, a value of one
8 We have also estimated a speciﬁcation in which we interact the variable at least one same with the various types. Our results (not reported in Table 7
or the sake of parsimony) indicate that having another team member of the same type is more important for spiteful types than for efﬁciency lovers: the
ffect  is highly signiﬁcant for both types, but the coefﬁcient for SPI is much higher than for EFF (3.70 vs. 1.14).
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Table  8
Chat content, categories of arguments.
Category Description Relative frequency
A1 Majority: when two members have the same preference, the third member should follow 0.131
A2  Selﬁsh: simply maximize own material payoff 0.160
A3i  Weak positive: willingness to give more to the passive team, provided this comes at no own cost 0.074
A3ii  Strong positive: willingness to give something up in order to increase the passive team’s payoff 0.092
A4i  Weak negative: tendency to give less to the passive team, provided this comes at no own  cost 0.025
A4ii Strong negative: willingness to give something up in order to reduce the passive team’s payoff 0.004
A5  Cake size maximization: maximize total payoff 0.074
A6  Pareto: increase payoff of both teams 0.025
A7  Fairness/egalitarianism: fairness-related arguments 0.050
A8  Conditional cooperation: place themselves in the position of the passive team, recognizing that
cooperation among teams could maximize total earnings
0.064
A9 Unanimity at any cost: want to reach a unanimous decision quickly, exact choices are less important 0.064
Table 9
Content analysis.
Tobit regressions, marginal effects
Dependent variable: assert
(right-censored at 10, left-censored at
0)
(1) (2)
SPI −1.774**
(0.717)
IAV −0.744
(0.846)
ILO 1.002
(1.235)
At least one same 1.374***
(0.480)
WTPd 3.992***
(1.056)
WTPa −0.210
(1.138)
Female 0.085
(0.041)
0.155
(0.458)
Age 0.035
(0.054)
0.053
(0.040)
Machiavelli 0.002
(0.012)
0.009
(0.013)
A1 1.760**
(0.802)
1.260*
(0.671)
A2  −1.060*
(0.560)
−1.305**
(0.526)
A3i  1.915
(1.215)
1.073*
(0.564)
A3ii  −1.949**
(0.835)
−1.414**
(0.569)
A4  −0.587
(2.071)
−0.392
(1.727)
A5 0.663
(0.964)
0.708
(0.822)
A6 0.407
(1.246)
−0.267
(1.037)
A7 −1.157
(0.792)
−0.583
(0.752)
A8 0.039
(0.927)
−0.546
(0.685)
A9 1.365*
(0.808)
0.871
(0.557)
Constant 7.315***
(1.711)
6.966***
(1.421)
Prob  > F 0.001 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.081
N = 141; standard errors in brackets, clustered by team.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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as assigned to that particular category for the subject in question; otherwise the assigned value was  zero. The cross-coder
orrelation over all categories was 0.61. Finally, to create a single variable for each category and subject, we averaged the
ntries of the two coders so that the ﬁnal value of the variable could be zero, one half (if only one of the coders classiﬁed
hat entry as an argument), or one (if both coders did so).9
Table 8 also shows the frequency with which the various types of arguments were used in the chats. The most commonly
sed argument is the maximization of own material payoffs (selﬁsh argument), and it is employed by roughly one in six
ndividuals regardless of type – with the exception of the four individuals classiﬁed as ILO, who never used this argument.
he majority argument A1 is also used relatively often by individuals of all types. The positive arguments A3i and A3ii, on
he other hand, are used almost exclusively by efﬁciency lovers, and so is the conditional cooperation argument. Also, as one
ight expect, efﬁciency lovers are the only ones who use arguments in favor of cake size maximization and Pareto efﬁciency.
here are only ﬁve cases of weak negative and only one case of strong negative arguments, therefore for the remainder of
he analysis we pool these two categories under a single “negative” category, called A4.
Table 9 replicates the two regressions of Table 7, adding the ten types of arguments as explanatory variables. The ﬁrst
hing to note is that all the ﬁndings presented in Section 4.2 are robust to this change in speciﬁcation.10 With respect
o the success of the various types of arguments, one observes the following. First, somewhat counter-intuitively, selﬁsh
rguments (category A2) are associated with lower assertiveness. It appears to be the case that openly advocating a purely
elﬁsh choice criterion limits one’s success in convincing the rest of the team. An interesting pattern emerges for positive
rguments (categories A3i and A3ii). Statements in favor of altruistic behavior toward the passive team are associated with
ower assertiveness if they suggest the sacriﬁce of own payoffs (strong positive attitude), but with higher assertiveness if they
nvolve a costless improvement (weak positive attitude) – although the latter effect is only weakly signiﬁcant in the second
peciﬁcation. The other categories of “distributional” arguments (i.e., statements referring explicitly to choice criteria for
he payoff allocation, such as negative attitude, welfare maximization, Pareto efﬁciency, and fairness) all have insigniﬁcant
oefﬁcients, but we do ﬁnd that certain “non-distributional” arguments matter: subjects who  play the “majority card” (A1)
re, on average, more successful at convincing their team to adopt their initial proposals, and so are those who  urge for
nanimity (A9) in order to avoid implementation of the default allocation (which yields zero income for the team members).
. Conclusion
This paper has compared revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams, focusing in particular on the ques-
ion how the revealed distributional preferences of team members shape a team’s allocation decisions. We  have found strong
ifferences between individuals and teams in revealed distributional preferences. Speciﬁcally, teams are signiﬁcantly more
enevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality, while benevolence in the domain of advantageous
nequality is similar across decision-making regimes. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that teams never
ake choices that are consistent with any form of inequality aversion, while a substantial fraction (15%) of individuals are
lassiﬁed as inequality averse. Spiteful types are also markedly more frequent among individuals than among teams. On the
ther hand, teams are far more often classiﬁed as efﬁciency lovers. The fact that team decision making results in a very high
roportion (over 90%) of choices consistent with a taste for efﬁciency and at the same time eliminates choices consistent
ith inequality aversion, is in our view the single most interesting result of this study. Our analysis of the communication
ithin teams (via chat) has shown that efﬁciency lovers are more assertive, meaning that they are better in implementing
heir preferences even when other team members have divergent individual preferences. Moreover, our chat analysis has
evealed that some arguments are more persuasive than others. In particular, an interesting ﬁnding has been that appeals
o own-money maximization make it less likely to get one’s way, indicating that convincing others to follow a particular
uggestion needs more socially acceptable arguments.
Given the strong differences between individuals and teams in revealed distributional preferences it seems important
o address the question whether distributional preferences, as measured by the test employed in the current paper, have
xplanatory value for actual behavior. That this is indeed the case is shown in two recent studies: Balafoutas et al. (2012)
nvestigate in a standard lab experiment the relationship between distributional archetypes (as assigned by the test used
n the current paper) and competitive behavior. They ﬁnd that distributional archetypes differ systematically – and in an
ntuitively plausible way – in their response to competitive pressure, in their performance in a competitive environment and
n their willingness to compete, and that controlling for the effects of distributional preferences, as well as for risk attitudes
nd some other factors, closes the large gender gap in competitive behavior found in other studies. Hedegaard et al. (2011)
se the same test to examine in a large-scale internet experiment the impact of distributional concerns on the contribution
ehavior in a standard (linear) public goods game. They ﬁnd that distributional archetypes differ systematically in their
9 An alternative procedure would have been to assign a value of one to a particular argument if at least one of the two  coders classiﬁed it as such. To
heck  robustness, we  repeated the analysis in this section using this alternative method. This led to only a few minor changes in the results.
10 Given that different types of subjects use certain arguments more frequently than others, the correlation between the distributional preference type
ummies or willingness to pay and the chat categories could in principle lead to multicollinarity problems. Therefore, to check robustness, we estimated
ersions of the regressions in Table 9 in which we  omitted the type dummies and WTPd, WTPa, effectively leading to no change in the signiﬁcance levels
f  the chat coefﬁcients. In addition, we estimated OLS versions of Table 9 regressions, which allow us to formally test for – and reject – the presence of
ulticollinearity on the basis of the very low variance inﬂation factors for all independent variables.
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contribution behavior, and that accounting for the differences explains roughly half of the gap between actual behavior of
subjects in the lab and the theoretical benchmark derived under the assumption of common knowledge that players are
rational and selﬁsh. Together these ﬁndings clearly indicate that distributional preference types as discussed in the current
paper have explanatory value for actual behavior.
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